Revolution again in Kyrgyzstan: forward to the past? by Schmitz, Andrea
www.ssoar.info
Revolution again in Kyrgyzstan: forward to the
past?
Schmitz, Andrea
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Schmitz, A. (2021). Revolution again in Kyrgyzstan: forward to the past? (SWP Comment, 8/2021). Berlin:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://
doi.org/10.18449/2021C08
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.





NO. 8 JANUARY 2021 Introduction 
Revolution Again in Kyrgyzstan: 
Forward to the Past? 
Andrea Schmitz 
Kyrgyzstan’s presidential election and constitutional referendum on 10 January 2021 
represent the provisional endpoint of a series of violent episodes that has gripped the 
country since October 2020. The victory of the populist Sadyr Japarov and approval 
for his plan to reintroduce a presidential system of government prepares the ground 
for a dismantling of democratic principles and rule of law, so that politically Kyrgyz-
stan is set to look more like its Central Asian neighbours. A new constitution is in 
preparation. The draft bears the portents of a neo-traditional roll-back that rebuffs a 
young generation demanding more democracy and rule of law, and has the potential 
to deeply polarise the nation. 
 
The early election emerged out of a politi-
cal crisis triggered by violent protests that 
toppled the government – for the third 
time after 2005 and 2010. The protests were 
sparked by vote-buying and other irregular-
ities during the 4 October elections to the 
single-chamber parliament, the Jogorku 
Kenesh. Of the sixteen parties that stood for 
election only four passed the seven percent 
hurdle: Birimdik represents the political 
establishment backing (now former) Presi-
dent Sooronbai Jeenbekov (elected October 
2017), while Mekenim Kyrgyzstan is widely 
believed to function as the political wing 
of organised crime. Two minor opposition 
parties also won seats. 
Supporters of the defeated parties rallied 
to protest the irregularities documented 
during the campaign and demanded that 
the result be annulled. The Central Election 
Commission quickly conceded, on 6 Octo-
ber declaring the vote invalid to “avoid 
tension” and announcing a rerun in 
November. By that point, however, such 
concessions could no longer appease the 
protesters: obviously, more was at stake 
than a new parliament. A social media 
campaign mobilised highly aggressive pro-
tests dominated by supporters of Sadyr 
Japarov – who since has been calling the 
shots in Bishkek. 
The Government Falls 
Japarov’s political career began during the 
“tulip revolution” of 2005, which ended the 
rule of Askar Akayev and brought Kurman-
bek Bakiyev to power. Bakiyev and his Ak Jol 
party combined a nationalist agenda with 
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an increasingly authoritarian style of gov-
ernment. In April 2010 he in turn was 
driven from office by mass protests. The 
significance of this second revolution 
was that it brought about a constitutional 
reform redistributing power between the 
president, prime minister and parliament 
and laid the groundwork for a parliamen-
tary system. Japarov continued to promote 
the nationalist line, now as a member 
of parliament for the new Ata-Jurt party, 
which was founded as a vehicle for Baki-
yev’s supporters. He and associates did not 
shy from violent methods, storming the 
seat of the president and parliament in 
2012 in an attempt to overthrow the gov-
ernment. Japarov avoided a prison sentence 
by fleeing abroad, but was detained in 2017 
while attempting to re-enter the country 
and sentenced to eleven-and-a-half years 
imprisonment. 
Japarov was still in a high-security prison 
in Bishkek when the vote was held on the 
4 October 2020. As the post-election protests 
swelled, demonstrators stormed the prison 
on 5 October and freed Japarov along with 
a string of other political figures. While the 
others were soon back behind bars, Japarov’s 
supporters installed him as leader within 
days. Faced with protesters threatening vio-
lence the prime minister resigned on 6 Oc-
tober and Japarov declared himself head of 
government by the “will of the people”. 
Parliament initially refused to back him, 
but relented after street fighting continued 
between Japarov’s supporters and oppo-
nents, appointing him prime minister in 
an extraordinary session of parliament on 
10 October. The legitimacy of the vote was 
contested, the decisive session being in-
quorate with fewer than half the members 
present. But the new leader moved fast, in 
particular appointing members of his net-
work – many of them associates of former 
President Bakiyev – to key positions. The 
first cabinet meeting was held on 12 Octo-
ber; two days later parliament confirmed 
the self-appointed prime minister, this time 
with the required quorum. 
Japarov had not yet reached his goal, how-
ever. His supporters continued to occupy 
strategic locations in Bishkek and demanded 
the resignation of President Jeenbekov. 
Jeenbekov had indicated his willingness 
to step down, but initially insisted on an 
orderly succession. He was gone by 15 Octo-
ber, plainly under pressure from Japarov 
and his militant supporters. Kanat Isayev, 
as speaker of parliament Jeenbekov’s con-
stitutional interim successor, declined the 
opportunity. On 16 October parliament ap-
pointed Japarov instead, and the Supreme 
Court acquitted him of all outstanding 
charges. Japarov was now both prime min-
ister and interim president. 
Parliamentary Rubber Stamp 
Japarov had always been clear that he 
intended to restore Kyrgyzstan’s presiden-
tial system, prepare a new constitution and 
have it approved by referendum. But first 
new elections to the Jogorku Kenesh had to 
be held: Under pressure from Japarov’s par-
liamentary associates they had been post-
poned again by the Central Election Com-
mission – to 20 December – citing cir-
cumstances beyond its control. This was 
not the only instance of what Kyrgyz legal 
experts regard as unconstitutional trans-
gression of parliamentary powers. An 
amendment to the Electoral Law rushed 
through by a majority of deputies on 22 Oc-
tober permitted the Jogorku Kenesh election 
to be postponed until summer 2021. The 
parliamentary vote was accompanied by 
gross procedural violations and probably 
also outright fraud. Postponing the election 
was crucial for Japarov, enabling him to 
mobilise support for a rapid constitutional 
amendment through strategic alliances 
in the existing Jogorku Kenesh and thus ob-
viating the danger of a new parliament 
blocking his plans. 
The Constitutional Chamber of the 
Supreme Court rejected a case brought by 
Kyrgyz activists seeking to challenge the par-
liament’s decision on the basis of an amicus 
curiae brief that it itself had requested from 
the Venice Commission of the Council of 
Europe. Nor were protests and demonstra-
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tions able to stop the roll-out of an obviously 
strategically planned transformation of the 
political system. On 17 November the par-
liament website published a draft proposal 
for a new constitution, which probably 
originates from still influential circles as-
sociated with former President Bakiyev; 
Talant Mamytov, who stepped in as acting 
head of state on 14 November to allow 
Japarov to stand in the presidential elec-
tion, appointed an 89-member commission 
to finalise the text. At the same time the 
date was set for the presidential election 
and the parallel referendum in which the 
voters were to choose between a “presiden-
tial republic”, a “parliamentary republic” 
or “neither option” (the latter meaning to 
maintain the status quo). While experts 
were still arguing over whether it was legiti-
mate to hold a referendum without giving 
the public opportunity to properly debate 
the proposal, parliament was again creating 
facts on the ground: A compliant majority 
rushed the required legislation through on 
10 December. 
Forward to the Past 
Almost 80 percent of voters chose Japarov 
on 10 January, and even more backed a 
presidential system of government. Even if 
turnout was slightly less than 40 percent, 
the result is beyond doubt. The way is clear 
for the constitutional transformation 
desired by Japarov and his associates. While 
the proposal has yet to be finalised, and 
there will probably be another referendum 
to confirm it, it clearly introduces far-
reaching changes. As would be expected in 
a presidential system the president heads 
the executive, and is permitted to serve two 
five-year terms (rather than previously one 
six-year term). The prime minister is – in 
a departure from the 2010 constitution – 
appointed by and answerable to the presi-
dent. Parliament can remove the president 
only on grounds of grave misconduct or 
medical incapacity. 
The constitutional proposal is imbued 
with neo-traditionalism. While the size of 
the single-chamber parliament is likely to 
be reduced from 120 to 90 (as it was before 
2010), a “congress of the people” (kurultay) 
modelled on Kyrgyz tradition is to function 
as “supreme consultative and coordinating 
organ of popular rule”. The modalities of 
election or appointment of its members 
have yet to be clarified. The president will 
decide when the congress convenes and 
report to it; it will advise him on appoint-
ments and all areas of policy. 
Unlike the constitution of 2010, the new 
proposal of 2020 makes no mention of rule 
of law. Instead the preamble emphasises 
“orientation on the traditions and recom-
mendations of the ancestors” and “moral 
principles common to mankind”, which 
are explained in a specific article and place 
special weight on patriarchal norms of 
family, tradition and religion. The dissemi-
nation of information that contradicts 
“accepted moral values and traditions” 
becomes an offence subject to prosecution. 
If these values are granted constitutional 
status it must be feared that they will also 
be codified in positive law. 
A Polarised Society 
These changes represent a clear rejection 
of the democratic principles and rule of law 
established by the 2010 revolution. Japarov 
has consistently legitimised his power grab 
as “the will of the people”. He enjoys the 
support of a rapidly mobilisable alliance of 
the disaffected – who reject the parliamen-
tary system and its political and intellectual 
establishment – as well as the backing of 
significant sections of the elites. The idea of 
a strong president ensuring order and jus-
tice is apparently attractive to the national-
ists and conservatives who make up the bulk 
of Japarov’s supporters. They skew heavily 
rural, where large parts of the population 
struggle to make ends meet. The populist 
promise of “honest politics” resonates 
there, as do Japarov’s simplistic claims and 
explanations. 
Criticisms of Japarov’s democratic defi-
cits do no harm to his popularity. The open 
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and latent violence that propelled him to 
power does not in the eyes of his supporters 
speak against him, nor did his aggressive 
election campaign or the fact that he diverted 
state resources to fund it. Even the suspicion 
that prominent criminals funded Japarov’s 
campaign and that his popularity was 
boosted by professional social media mani-
pulation appears not to concern his adher-
ents. 
Hard times are ahead for critics of Japa-
rov’s authoritarian populism. This applies 
to all the civil society organisations, intel-
lectuals, journalists, and not least the many 
women who have been campaigning for 
years for human rights and a democratic 
order. These groups have experienced in-
timidation and threats of violence since the 
events of October 2020, and it must be feared 
that the pressure will increase. This applies 
above all in the event of Japarov failing 
to fulfil the expectations of his supporters. 
In order to stifle protests he might – like 
Bakiyev before him – be tempted to deflect 
criticism using increasingly repressive means. 
Germany and the EU should do every-
thing in their power to prevent that hap-
pening, firstly pressing for a fundamental 
revision of the draft constitution, which 
is currently being reviewed by the Venice 
Commission. Beyond that, support for criti-
cal media should be foregrounded and 
prioritised in political dialogue. 
Dr. Andrea Schmitz is Senior Associate in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division at SWP. 
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